SettleMint
ChangelogDALP 3.2

Controls that hold when tested

Six controls close gaps found in a two-class share structure: expiring claims, a sanctions rule the subject cannot undo, a minimum holding, and a supermajority.

DALP 3.2 adds expiring verification claims, issuer-controlled sanctions lists, and further controls for holdings, governance, and payouts. These controls apply to instruments that enable them.

Compliance & Identity

New controls for eligibility and asset operations

A dual-class structure gives one class more voting power per share than another, which stresses governance and eligibility rules harder than a single class does. Most of what it exposed was not specific to it.

Claims
Can carry an expiry
Sanctions
Issuer-held block list
Holdings
Minimum enforceable
Governance
Supermajority binds

A verification that stops being true

A completed identity check becomes a claim, meaning a statement from a trusted issuer recorded against a party's on-chain identity. Until now a claim was true until somebody revoked it, which does not match how verification actually works: a document expires, and a prior check may no longer satisfy the instrument's policy.

A claim can now carry a valid-until date. An asset that enables claim-expiry checking requires the recipient to have a live claim on each configured topic; the sender can still transfer out. By default, the check treats older claims without dates as non-expiring. An asset can instead require dated claims.

A sanctions rule its subject cannot remove

The sanctions control must remain under issuer authority.

The obvious way to express a sanctions control is a rule saying the party must not hold a sanctions claim. It fails. A party holds a management key on its own identity, and that key satisfies any purpose gate, so the subject of the control can delete the claim that incriminates them. A rule anyone can escape by deleting their own record is not a control.

Sanctions are therefore enforced through a block list the issuer holds and the subject cannot touch. The claim remains as evidence, but the enforcement does not depend on it. More generally, the platform now refuses any eligibility rule built as a negation over a topic the holder can remove from themselves, rather than accepting it and letting it silently fail to bind. An identity rule that cannot enforce is rejected when it is written.

Holdings, governance, and payout controls

  • A minimum holding. An asset can require a floor holding per party, checked when tokens are issued. The fee collector is exempt, since it holds by function rather than as an investor.
  • A supermajority that binds. A governance vote can require more than a simple majority, and the threshold is bound to a floor set in governance rather than being a number a proposal can set for itself.
  • A payout that checks its currency first. Before a distribution is declared, the platform checks that the asset it will pay in is one the recipients can actually receive, so a payout does not get declared and then fail at the moment holders try to claim.

Reporting and templates

Two smaller additions round it out. A reporting obligation can now be one whose duty is discharged by publication rather than by filing with someone, which is a real category of obligation that previously had no honest representation. And two instrument templates can be declared as one structure, which is what lets a two-class share structure be modelled as the single thing it is rather than as two unrelated assets that happen to share a name.

Availability and compatibility

These are additive controls, and none of them switches itself on. An existing asset keeps the rules it was configured with, and a rule you do not configure does not apply.

Understand compliance policy → · Understand on-chain identity → · Configure modules → · Set global controls →

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